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Air France Airbus A321 F-GMZC approaching with landing gear extended against a blue sky
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Air France A321 Landed at Paris With Its Stabilizer Trimmed Near the Nose-Down Stop, BEA Finds

Simple adaptation · 5 min read

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The incident

On April 27, 2025, an Air France Airbus A321, F-GMZC, was flying from Malaga to Paris Charles de Gaulle. During the descent, it lost electric control of its horizontal stabilizer. The crew declared PAN PAN and asked for a long runway. The aircraft landed safely. Nobody on board was hurt.

France's BEA has now published its final report. Its main finding is about what happened after the warning. The pilots misunderstood one checklist line and trimmed the stabilizer to 3.5 degrees nose-down. This is half a degree from its stop. At the same time, the flight computers moved the elevators nose-up to compensate, and there was no sign of this.

On board were 188 passengers, five cabin crew and two pilots. The first officer was flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring.

The flight

06:06 UTC, near FL300. An ELAC 2 pitch fault appears. The crew decides to continue to Paris.

06:15 UTC, near FL235. A STABILIZER JAM warning appears. The autopilot disconnects, automatic trim is lost, and the controls go to alternate law. The first officer hand-flies.

06:42 UTC, passing 3,400 feet. The stabilizer is at 3.5 degrees nose-down. The limit is 4 degrees. The elevators are at 11 degrees nose-up.

06:44–06:46 UTC. Gear extension switches the controls to direct law. In the flare, the elevators move from 11 to 19 degrees nose-up. The aircraft lands on runway 08L.

The crew set landing flaps first and lowered the gear early. They wanted time to adapt to direct law.

Airbus simulations for the BEA show that, on this flight, at least 5 degrees of elevator margin remained. Airbus found no scenario in which the flare would be hard to control.

How pitch control works

An A320-family aircraft controls pitch with two elevators and a trimmable horizontal stabilizer. Pilots can also move the stabilizer with trim wheels in the cockpit.

Normal and alternate law. The sidestick asks for a load factor, and the computers trim the stabilizer automatically. If automatic trim is lost in alternate law, the computers hold the load factor only with the elevators.

Direct law. The stick moves the elevators directly, and the pilot trims to reduce the stick input. The report says that this is the only situation in which A320 pilots practice manual trim in the simulator.

The mistake

The STABILIZER JAM procedure asks the crew to check that manual trim works, and then to "TRIM FOR NEUTRAL ELEV". Only the detailed manual explains this line fully: the crew should watch the flight control display and use the wheel to keep both elevators near neutral. This way, the elevators keep their full authority.

But the first officer called out a line from the direct law checklist, "USE MAN PITCH TRIM". He trimmed to reduce the stick inputs that he thought he needed. For each nose-down turn of the wheel, the computers gave more nose-up elevator. The BEA notes that the aircraft's handling gave no sign of this.

The captain understood the line as an instruction to set the stabilizer to zero. As the workload grew, he did not monitor the trim closely. Both pilots noticed the unusual trim setting only at the gate.

Why it happened

The BEA lists three contributing factors:

no training in alternate law with manual-only trim;

an unclear ECAM item;

incomplete monitoring by the captain.

The report says that training simulators cannot even reproduce this combination. It also says that the lines "MAN PITCH TRIM … USE" and "MAN PITCH TRIM … CHECK" look similar, and this made the mix-up more likely.

An incorrectly installed pin

The electric trim stopped working because the computers saw a difference of more than 0.6 degrees between the commanded and the measured stabilizer position.

Later, Air France and Airbus inspected the aircraft without the BEA. They found an incorrectly installed pin on the first officer's trim wheel. The pin had been there since 2019. The BEA says that the pin may have briefly jammed the mechanical trim linkage. But the parts were not kept, so nobody can confirm this.

Air France replaced the actuator and the ELAC 2, and the fault has not happened again on F-GMZC.

What Airbus did

In August 2025, Airbus sent an operator message about this warning. In November 2025, it added a detailed STABILIZER JAM procedure to the training manual.

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